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Public-Key Exposure / Quantum Risk

Paste a Bitcoin address (or a transaction ID) to check whether its public key is already exposed on-chain. A P2PKH / P2WPKH address only publishes HASH160(pubkey) until it spends — the first spend reveals the full public key. Before that, even a quantum computer has only the hash to attack. Once exposed, any coins left on the address are at risk from Shor's algorithm, which recovers the private key from the public key. This tool reports EXPOSED vs quantum-safe, shows the revealed key, and flags the at-risk balance. Everything runs in your browser.

newest for the address (exactly this many are scanned; a single TXID fetches just that one transaction)
Exposed = the address has spent at least once, so its public key is public and quantum-attackable. Quantum-safe = received-only, so only HASH160 is on-chain and the key stays hidden.
Balance 0 BTC
Received 0 BTC
TX 0
Instructions:
1. Enter a Bitcoin address (recommended) or a 64-character TXID.
2. For an address: it is EXPOSED if it has ever spent (its public key is then on-chain and quantum-attackable), or quantum-safe if it has only ever received (only HASH160 is public).
3. For a TXID: every input reveals its signer's full public key, so all of that transaction's inputs are listed as exposed.
4. When exposed, the revealed public key and the current at-risk balance are shown. An internet connection is required to fetch data from public block explorers.
Educational / read-only tool. Data is fetched live from public block-explorer APIs (blockstream.info, with blockchain.info as a fallback). This tool does not recover any private key — it only classifies whether a public key is already visible on-chain and therefore exposed to a future quantum attack (Shor's algorithm). A quantum-safe verdict means the key is hidden today; it becomes exposed the moment the address spends. To stay safe, never reuse an address and move funds to a fresh, never-spent address. Nothing here is a guarantee against future cryptographic advances.